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I. INTRODUCTION
In the current tax system, a corporation is treated as a separate
taxable entity.' This tax system is sometimes referred to as an entity
2tax or a double tax system. Since a corporation is a separate and
distinct entity from its owners, the shareholders, the default rule is
that transfers between them are treated as realization events. Without
a specific Internal Revenue Code (Code) provision providing
otherwise, such transactions will also require the parties to recognize
the realized gain or loss.3
Congress has enacted several nonrecognition corporate provisions
when forcing the recognition of income could prevent changes to the
form of ownership from taking place even if the changes would
provide a more efficient and economically beneficial structure. One
such provision is section 351, which provides nonrecognition
treatment to shareholders who contribute property to a controlled
This article focuses exclusively on domestic C corporations and their
shareholders. A "C corporation" is an organization taxed as a corporation that is not
an S corporation and an "S corporation" is one for which a valid election under
section 1362 is in effect. Citations to "I.R.C." or to the "Code" are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 as amended. In this article, a citation to a section number is to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 unless indicated otherwise.
2 The corporate tax system is labeled a "double tax" system because the
corporation is taxed once when it earns income and the shareholders are taxed when
the money is distributed to them in their capacity as shareholders. See generally
DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY S. LEHMAN, CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION 25-28
(5th ed. 2001).
3 I.R.C. § 1001(c).
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corporation in exchange for corporate stock.4 When section 351
applies, the shareholder's basis in the corporate stock received and the
corporation's basis in the contributed property are calculated to carry
forward any realized, but unrecognized gains or losses (subject to
certain exceptions described in this article).'
Assume, for example, that A, an individual taxpayer, transfers
Blackacre, unimproved land, to X Corporation (X) in exchange for
100 shares of X Corporation stock. A's basis in Blackacre is $50,000
and the fair market value of the property is $100,000. Assume A is the
sole shareholder of X and therefore the exchange qualifies for
nonrecognition treatment under section 351. A's basis in the X
Corporation stock received in the exchange is the same basis that A
had in Blackacre, $50,000.6 X takes a transferred basis in Blackacre.
X's basis in the contributed property is the same as A's basis at the
• 7
time of the contribution, so X has a $50,000 basis in Blackacre.
Until fairly recently, this same treatment applied when a
shareholder contributed depreciated property.8 Going back to the
example above, assume the property's fair market value is $20,000 and
A's basis is still $50,000. For the moment, ignore any specific
limitations that apply to this transaction. Ignoring those limitations,
A's basis in the X Corporation stock received in the exchange would
again be the same $50,000 basis that A had in Blackacre; and X would
also take a $50,000 basis in Blackacre.9
It is not difficult to understand why some commentators and
Congress view this example as abusive. A has used the corporate tax
system to create two depreciated assets from one. That is, A took the
depreciated asset Blackacre and, through a nonrecognition exchange
with X, created the depreciated asset of X Corporation stock while
also the corporation kept Blackacre as a depreciated asset. A was
able to create two tax losses (the loss that X will recognize when X
sells Blackacre and the loss that A will recognize when he sells his X
Corporation stock) from one depreciated asset.
In Part V of the article, we explore the question of the extent to
which the creation of a double loss should be considered an abuse of
4 I.R.C. § 351(a). See generally KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 2, at 616-19.
5 I.R.C. §§ 358, 362.
6 I.R.C. § 358(a).
7 I.R.C. § 362(a).
8 An "appreciated" asset is one whose fair market value is greater than its
adjusted basis. A "depreciated" asset is one whose adjusted basis is greater than its
fair market value.
9 I.R.C. §§ 358(a), 362(a).
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the tax system. As our title suggests, we conclude that it is an abuse
only in limited circumstances and that Congress has overreacted in
prohibiting all duplications of net built-in losses. It would be better to
tailor the restrictions to deal with those situations that are abusive.
Believing that any duplication of a net loss is an abuse, however,
Congress passed several provisions that prevent taxpayers from
creating a double net loss. As discussed in detail below, Parts II
through IV of the article review the operation of those provisions and
illustrate significant problems with their approaches. While those
provisions provide useful background material and illustrate the
history of congressional attempts to restrict the areas in which double
losses can be utilized, a reader interested only in our discussion of why
the creation of a double loss often is not an abuse may skip directly to
that section of the article.
Prior to 1986, the so-called General Utilities doctrine prevented a
corporation from recognizing a gain or loss on the distribution of
appreciated or depreciated assets to its shareholders.' ° While most of
the General Utilities doctrine was repudiated by amendments made as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a number of inroads to the
doctrine had arisen before that date.1' As a consequence of the 1986
amendments, subject to an exception for the liquidation of a
controlled subsidiary," a corporation is required to recognize gain on
making a distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders,
regardless of whether it was a liquidating or nonliquidating
• • • 13
distribution. As to losses realized on a corporation's distribution of a
depreciated asset, different treatment is accorded to liquidating
distributions than to nonliquidating distributions. A corporation will
not recognize a loss on making a nonliquidating distribution of
10 The doctrine derives its name from the 1935 decision of the Supreme Court in
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935). As applied
to liquidating distributions, the doctrine preceded that case and can be traced to a
regulation promulgated in 1919 that denied a corporation the realization of gain or
loss on liquidating distributions. Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 547 (1919), reprinted in 134
INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, 140 (Bernard D
Reams, Jr. ed. 1979).
" See KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 2, at 117-18.
12 I.R.C. §§ 332,337.
13 I.R.C. §§ 311(b), 336(a). As used herein, a "liquidating distribution" refers to
a distribution pursuant to the complete liquidation of the corporation. A
"nonliquidating distribution" refers to all other corporate distributions to
shareholders on account of, or in redemption of, their stock. Consequently, a
distribution made pursuant to a partial liquidation of a corporation will be included in
the term "nonliquidating distribution."
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depreciated property. However, subject to limitations, section
336(a) provides that a corporation will recognize a loss on making a
liquidating distribution of depreciated property. 5  A corporation
realizes a loss on making a liquidating distribution of an item of
property in the amount by which its basis in the property exceeds the
property's fair market value. The limitations on the corporation's
recognition of its realized loss are set forth in section 336(d)(1)-(2). 16
It is a thesis of this article that two of the three limitations imposed by
section 336(d)(1)-(2) no longer serve a useful purpose, contravene
policies underlying a Code provision adopted more recently,
sometimes produces harsh, inappropriate consequences, and so should
be repealed. The one remaining limitation of section 336(d)(1) never
did serve a useful purpose, so it never should have been adopted.
Part II of this article examines the operation of section 336(d)(1)-
(2) and explores the likely reasons for the adoption of each of the
limitations that it imposes. Part III examines section 362(e) that was
adopted in 2004 to deal with a corporation's acquisition of a
depreciated asset from a shareholder in such manner as to provide
both the corporation and the shareholder with a built-in loss. Part IV
considers the merits and defects of the limitations provided by section
336(d)(1)-(2), the effect that the adoption of section 362(e) has on
those provisions, and whether the section 336 provisions should be
repealed. Part V questions whether the doubling of a loss deduction
when a shareholder contributes a depreciated asset to a corporation
(one potential deduction for the shareholder and one for the
corporation) is an abuse of such scope that it warrants the blanket
prohibition that Congress adopted. Part VI sets forth the authors'
conclusions.
14 I.R.C. § 311(a).
5 One exception to this rule applies to the liquidation of a controlled subsidiary.
See I.R.C. § 336(d)(3); see also I.R.C. §§ 332, 336(a), 337. Section 267(a)(1), which
denies a deduction for losses recognized on a sale or exchange between related
parties, does not apply to corporate liquidating distributions.
16 Section 336(d)(3) prevents a controlled subsidiary from recognizing a loss on
making liquidating distributions and the authors have no complaint about that
provision. But see George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related
Matters) After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 575, 623-24 (1987)
(contending that loss recognition should not be denied for distributions to minority
shareholders). The provisions that the authors believe should be repealed are section
336(d)(1)-(2).
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II. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY SECTION 336(D)(1)-(2)
When Congress repealed the General Utilities doctrine in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, it expressed a concern that taxpayers could
utilize various means to turn that repeal to their advantage.17 To
prevent that from occurring, in the same Act, Congress added
subsections (d)(1)-(2) to section 336. Neither the House bill nor the
Senate's amendments to the bill that became the 1986 Act had a
provision comparable to subsections (d)(1)-(2); the provisions were
added in the conference agreement. 8 Perhaps it is due to their last
minute addition to the 1986 Act that these provisions are so poorly
crafted.
A. The Operation of Subsection (d) (1)
Subsection (d)(1) applies only to liquidating distributions that are
made to a shareholder who is a related person within the meaning of
section 267. Note that the express terms of section 267(a)(1), which
prevent a deduction for losses recognized from sales and exchanges
between related persons, make that provision inapplicable to
corporate liquidations. Congress determined in 1986 to impose a
limitation on the deduction of losses from corporate liquidations, but
in only a few limited circumstances. If the shareholder is an
individual, the shareholder is a related person if, after applying certain
stock attribution rules,19 the shareholder owns more than 50% in value
of the liquidating corporation's outstanding stock.2° If the shareholder
is itself a corporation, the shareholder will be a related person if it
owns stock of the liquidating corporation having either more than
50% of the value of the liquidating corporation's outstanding stock or
more than 50% of the total voting power of the liquidating
21
corporation's outstanding voting stock. If, however, the liquidating
corporation is a controlled subsidiary, so that section 332 applies to
the liquidation, then the liquidating corporation cannot recognize a
loss on a distribution to any shareholder regardless of whether the
17 H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-200 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N 4075, 4286.
18 Id. at 11-198 to 11-200.
19 For this purpose, a shareholder is deemed to own stock that is owned by some
other person who bears a specified relationship to the shareholder. I.R.C. § 267(c).
10 I.R.C. §§ 267(b)(2), 336(d)(1)(A).
21 I.R.C. §§ 267(b)(3), 267(f)(1), 336(d)(1)(A).
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shareholder is a related person.
A liquidating corporation is not barred by subsection (d)(1) from
recognizing a loss on all distributions to related persons. There are
only two situations in which that provision prevents a corporation
from recognizing a loss. 23  The first is when the distribution of the
24depreciated property was not made pro rata to the shareholders. The
second is when the depreciated property constitutes "disqualified
property. 2 1 "Disqualified property" is property that was acquired by
the liquidating corporation within five years of the distribution either
26in a section 351 exchange, or as a contribution to the corporation's
22 I.R.C. § 336(d)(3); see also I.R.C. §§ 332,337(a).
23 Of course, if the liquidating corporation is a controlled subsidiary and if
section 332 applies to the liquidation, then the liquidating corporation will not
recognize a loss on any of its liquidating distributions. See I.R.C. § 336(d)(3); see also
I.R.C. §§ 332, 337(a).
24 I.R.C. § 336(d)(1)(A)(i). The most plausible construction of that provision is
that it applies when a distribution of depreciated property to a related person is other
than that person's pro rata portion of the depreciated property. BORIS I. BITrKER &
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS T 10.05[3][a] at 10-33 (7th ed. 2002). If that construction is adopted,
a distribution of depreciated property to a related person of the latter's pro rata share
of that property will not trigger this limitation provision even if non-pro rata
distributions were made to other shareholders. However, contrary to that
construction, the so-called Blue Book to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (a general
explanation of the Act prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation)
states: "a liquidating corporation may not recognize loss with respect to a distribution
of property to a related person ...unless ...the property is distributed to all
shareholders on a pro rata basis .... STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100th
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 341 (Joint
Comm. Print 1987), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/jcs-10-87.pdf [hereinafter
BLUE BOOK].
Note that section 336(d)(1) does not apply to liquidating distributions to a
shareholder who is not a related person and so the corporation's realized loss on
making such a distribution will be recognized unless some other Code provision
disallows it.
25 I.R.C. § 336(d)(1)(A)(ii).
26 A transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for stock of the latter is
referred to in this article as a "section 351 exchange" if the exchange qualifies for
treatment under section 351 of the Code. Section 351 provides nonrecognition for an
exchange of property for a corporation's stock if certain conditions are satisfied. If
section 351 applies to an exchange, the corporation generally takes the same basis in
the property it acquired that the shareholder had in it and the shareholder takes the
same basis in the stock received as the basis that the shareholder had in the property
that was transferred to the corporation. I.R.C. §§ 358(a), 362(a); see I.R.C. § 351. An
alteration of those general rules for the determination of basis for depreciated
property was adopted in 2004 and is discussed in Part III of this article. See I.R.C. §
Virginia Tax Review
capital.27 Note that there is no requirement that the property acquired
within the five-year period was a depreciated asset when acquired; it is
necessary only that it was acquired in either a section 351 exchange or
as a contribution to capital.
B. The Operation of Subsection (d)(2) - The Anti-Stuffing Provision
Subsection (d)(2) also applies to property that was acquired by a
liquidating corporation in a section 351 exchange or a contribution to
capital, but subsection (d)(2) applies only if the acquired property was
28depreciated at the time of its acquisition. Subsection (d)(2) is
sometimes referred to as the "anti-stuffing provision." Unlike
subsection (d)(1), whose application rests exclusively on objective
factors, subsection (d)(2) applies only if a principal purpose of the
liquidating corporation's acquisition of the depreciated asset was to
29
recognize a loss on that property in connection with a liquidation.
While the provision does not explicitly set a time frame for its
operation, it does state that if the asset was acquired within two years
of the date on which the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation, the
asset will be treated as having been acquired for the tainted purpose,
except as provided otherwise in regulations.30  Despite the strict
language of that provision, the legislative history indicates that the
two-year provision merely creates a rebuttable presumption and that
this presumption will be disregarded if there is a clear and substantial
relationship between the contributed property and the conduct of the
corporation's current or future business enterprises. 31 The presence of
362(e). For our purposes, we will ignore other adjustments to basis that apply in
certain circumstances because they do not impact the issues discussed herein. For
example, the basis of both the stock received and the property transferred may be
altered if the transferee assumes a liability in the transaction or if the transferor
receives boot (i.e. property other than qualified stock of the transferee corporation).
See I.R.C. §§ 358(a), (d)(1), (h), 362(a), (d).
27 I.R.C. § 336(d)(1)(B). The term also includes any property in the hands of the
liquidating corporation whose adjusted basis is determined, in whole or in part, by
reference to the adjusted basis of disqualified property. Id. For example, if an item of
disqualified property were exchanged for property of like kind in an exchange that
qualified for nonrecognition under section 1031, the replacement property will also be
disqualified property since its basis is determined under section 1031(d) by reference
to the basis of the exchanged property.
28 I.R.C. § 336(d)(2)(A).
29 I.R.C. § 336(d)(2)(B)(i)(II).
30 I.R.C. § 336(d)(2)(B)(ii).
31 H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-201 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286. The conferees also stated that the provision generally will
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a "presumption" for acquisitions within the two-year period would
not, by itself, show that acquisitions made prior to the two-year period
are necessarily excluded from the subsection (d)(2) limitation; but the
legislative history indicates that the rule will be applied to acquisitions
made more than two years prior to the adoption of a plan of
liquidation "only in the most rare and unusual ... circumstances.,
2
If subsection (d)(2) applies, it does not explicitly deny recognition
of a loss. Instead, it causes a reduction of the corporation's basis in
the acquired asset, but only for the purpose of determining a loss. The
reduction of basis will effectively deny the corporation that amount of
loss deduction, but the significance of accomplishing that through a
reduction of basis is that it will limit the corporation's loss on a sale of
the acquired asset as well as on liquidating distributions. The amount
of reduction of the corporation's basis in the asset is equal to the
amount by which the asset was depreciated at the time of acquisition
(i.e., the built-in loss).33 The following example illustrates how
subsection (d)(2) operates:
Example 1. On September 12, 2000, F transferred Blackacre
(unimproved land) to the X Corporation in exchange for 10
shares of X stock and the exchange qualified for
nonrecognition under section 351. The 10 shares of stock had
a fair market value of $75,000. F had a basis of $120,000 in
Blackacre, which had a fair market value of $75,000 at the
time of the exchange. While F realized a $45,000 loss on that
exchange, none of the loss was recognized because of section
351. In the absence of section 336(d)(2), X would have a
basis of $120,000 in Blackacrem and F would have a basis of
$120,000 in the 10 shares of stock he received in the exchange.
On February 4, 2001, X sold Blackacre to an unrelated party
for its then fair market value of $70,000. If nothing else had
taken place, X would recognize a loss of $50,000 on that sale
($120,000 basis minus the $70,000 selling price). On June 3,
not apply to property acquired by the corporation within the first two years of its
existence. Id. See also BLUE BOOK, supra note 24, at 344.
32 H.R. REP. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-200 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286. See also BLUE BOOK, supra note 24, at 343.
33 I.R.C. § 336(d)(2)(A). The statute accomplishes this by reducing the
corporation's basis by the amount by which the adjusted basis of the asset exceeded
its fair market value immediately after the acquisition.
34 I.R.C. § 362(e)(2), which was adopted in 2004, does not apply to this example
because the transactions occurred prior to the effective date of that provision.
2006]
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2002 (less than two years after X acquired Blackacre in a
section 351 exchange), X adopted a plan of liquidation and
liquidated a few months later. F received $70,000 cash from
X as a liquidating distribution on the 10 shares of X stock that
F had acquired in the exchange and F thereby recognized a
$50,000 loss ($120,000 basis minus the $70,000 selling price).
Of the $50,000 loss amount, $45,000 is attributable to the
decline in Blackacre's value at the time of the section 351
exchange. So, if subsection (d)(2) is not applicable, the
$45,000 built-in loss of Blackacre's value at the time of the
section 351 exchange will be recognized twice - once by X
and once by F.
Assume that it is determined that a principal purpose of X's
acquisition of Blackacre was to recognize a loss on a sale of
the property in anticipation of a liquidation and that section
336(d)(2) applies to the transaction. Accordingly, for the
purpose of determining the loss that X recognized on the 2001
sale, the basis of Blackacre in X's hands is reduced by the
$45,000 amount by which the property was depreciated at the
time of the exchange. So, for loss purposes, X had a basis of
$75,000 in Blackacre and recognized a loss of $5,000 ($75,000
bass minus the $70,000 selling price) on the 2001 sale.
When X sold Blackacre in 2001, X did not know that
subsection (d)(2) would apply since a plan of liquidation had
not yet been adopted. Assume that X reported on its tax
return for 2001 a $50,000 loss from the sale. How should X
correct that report? X can file an amended return for 2001
and change the loss from the sale to $5,000. As an
alternative, Congress authorized the Treasury to promulgate
regulations that would allow X to include $45,000 in income
in its return for 2002 in lieu of reducing its 2001 loss by
$45,000.3" However, no regulation has yet been promulgated
to allow that alternative.
If, instead of selling Blackacre on February 4, 2001, X had
liquidated and distributed Blackacre pro rata among its
shareholders, none of whom is a related person, subsection
35 I.R.C. § 336(d)(2)(C).
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(d)(2) would reduce X's basis in Blackacre to $75,000 for the
purpose of measuring the loss on the distributions. The
resulting reduction of the loss recognized applies to the
distributions to all the shareholders even though they are not
related parties. Each shareholder will take a basis in his
distributed portion of Blackacre equal to the fair market
value of that portion.36
If both subsections (d)(1)-(2) apply to the same liquidating
distribution, subsection (d)(1) takes precedence.37 The order of
priority is important because subsection (d)(1) disallows the entire
amount of loss realized on a liquidating distribution to a related
person whereas subsection (d)(2) effectively disallows only the
amount that does not exceed the built-in loss at the time of the
corporation's acquisition of the property.
C. Congressional Reasons for Adopting Subsections (d) (1)-(2)
The Conference Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
commenting on the inclusion in the Act of the limitations on
recognition of losses imposed by section 336(d), stated:
The conferees are concerned that taxpayers may utilize
various means to avoid the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine, or otherwise take advantage of the new provisions,
to recognize losses in inappropriate situations or inflate the
amount of losses actually sustained. For example, under the
general rule permitting recognition of losses on liquidating
distributions, taxpayers may be able to create artificial losses
at the corporate level or to duplicate shareholder losses in
corporate solution through contribution of built-in loss
property. Consequently, the conference agreement includes
two provisions intended to prevent the recognition of such
381
corporate level losses.
The two provisions to which the Conference Report referred were
described immediately after the quoted paragraph and are enacted as
36 I.R.C. § 334(a).
37 See BLUE BOOK, supra note 24, at 342 n.86.
38 H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 11-200 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286.
20061
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section 336(d)(1)-(2).39
Let us consider what abuses the conferees likely had in mind.
First, consider how, in the absence of any limitations, a shareholder
might have been able to duplicate "shareholder losses in corporate
solution."40  Take Example 1 above 41 in which F owned Blackacre
(unimproved land) with a basis of $120,000, and a fair market value of
$75,000. If F had sold Blackacre for its value (instead of making the
section 351 exchange), F would have recognized a loss of $45,000.42
Instead, F exchanged Blackacre for 10 shares of X stock. F obtained a
basis of $120,000 in the 10 shares of stock, which had a value of
$75,000 when F acquired them. So, F can sell those 10 shares (or
surrender them in a liquidation of X) and recognize a loss of $45,000
($120,000 basis minus the $75,000 selling price).43 In addition, X
Corporation obtained a basis of $120,000 in Blackacre. If X were to
sell Blackacre for its $75,000 value, X would also recognize a loss of
$45,000 ($120,000 basis minus the $75,000 selling price)." Thus, the
single $45,000 loss in the hands of F would be duplicated by permitting
F to retain that loss and yet allowing X to recognize the same amount
of loss. A doubling of the loss would also occur if X were to liquidate
and distribute Blackacre to its shareholder as a liquidating
distribution. While a doubling of the loss facially appears to be an
abuse and Congress clearly considered it to be one, we will question in
Part V of this article the extent to which it is an actual abuse.
In its adoption of the 1986 limitations, Congress focused on the
extent to which the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine opened up
opportunities for abuse in the context of liquidations. So, the
limitations that Congress adopted in subsections (d)(1)-(2) apply only
if the corporation is liquidated even though the same problem can
arise in nonliquidating circumstances. Congress again addressed the
doubling of losses in 2004 when it added subsection (e) to section 362
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See supra Part II.B.
42 If Blackacre was held by F as an investment, the loss would be deductible
under section 165(c)(2) as a capital loss, subject to the limitations in section 1211(b).
43 The loss would be a deductible capital loss under section 165(c)(2), subject to
the limitations in section 1211(b).
The loss likely would be deductible either as a capital loss under section
165(a), subject to the limitation in section 1211(a), or as a loss under section 1231.
You will recall that the transaction described in Example 1 took place prior to the
effective date of section 362(e)(2), so that provision is inapplicable.
[Vol. 26:1
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of the Code 45 and the application of that provision is not limited to
liquidations.46 Section 362(e) is discussed in Part III.
1. Subsection (d)(2)
The anti-stuffing provision of subsection (d)(2) obviously is aimed
at the doubling of loss problem and the prevention of that doubling
appears to be the sole purpose of that provision. Subsection (d)(2)
accomplishes that goal by reducing the corporation's basis in the
acquired depreciated asset to eliminate any built-in loss. The
corporation's basis in the acquired asset is limited to the fair market
value of the asset at the time of the corporation's acquisition, but only
for the purpose of determining a loss. While the basis reduction
provision prevents the realization of a built-in loss whether the asset is
distributed to shareholders or sold to an outsider, it applies only if the
corporation adopts a plan of liquidation; and, even then, applies in
very limited circumstances. It rarely will apply if the plan of
liquidation is adopted more than two years after the acquisition of the
asset and the legislative history indicates it frequently will not apply
even when the plan is adopted within the two-year period.47 We will
examine in Part IV of this article the effect that the 2004 adoption of
section 362(e) has had on the operation of subsection (d)(2).48
45 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 836, 118 Stat.
1418, 1594-96 (2004).
46 Congressional concern over the creation of loss deductions is reflected in its
adoption of several other amendments to the Code. In the year 1999, Congress added
section 362(d)(1) to the Code to prevent a corporation's basis in property acquired in
a section 351 exchange or a reorganization from exceeding the property's fair market
value to the extent that the excess basis that otherwise would have existed was
generated by gain that the transferor recognized because of the transferee
corporation's assumption of liabilities. Miscellaneous Trade and Technical
Corrections Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-36, § 3001(b), 113 Stat. 127, 182 (1999). In
the year 2000, Congress added section 358(h) to the Code to prevent a corporate
transferee's assumption of a liability in connection with certain nonrecognition
transactions from providing the transferor with a basis in the stock received that is
greater than the stock's fair market value. Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. III, § 309(a), 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-638 (2000). In addition, in 2004, Congress amended several
partnership tax provisions to prevent the doubling or shifting of losses. See Pub. L.
No. 108-357, § 833, 118 Stat. 1418, 1589-92 (2004) (amending I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(C),
734, and 743).
47 See H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-200-01 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286; BLUE BOOK, supra note 24, at 343; supra text
accompanying notes 31-32.
48 The effect that the adoption of section 362(e)(2) has had on section
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2. The Disqualified Property Provision of Subsection (d)(1)
The doubling of loss possibility likely was the principal concern of
the disqualified property provision in subsection (d)(1).49 Insofar as
that provision is aimed at double loss recognition, it suffers from both
over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness. It applies even when the
property was not depreciated at the time it was acquired by the
corporation, in which case no doubling of a built-in loss is involved. It
applies only to liquidating distributions to a related person, so it does
not prevent a doubling of loss by having the corporation sell an
acquired depreciated asset or distribute it to a minority shareholder.
There is discussed below a possible explanation for those glitches in
the provision,0 but the authors do not find it convincing.
When a corporation distributes property in liquidation to a
related person, the parties have a tax incentive to undervalue the
distributed property in order to create or increase the size of a
deductible loss or to decrease the size of a gain, for both the
liquidating corporation and the shareholder. The risk of
undervaluation at the time of liquidation is just as present for property
that the corporation had purchased as it is for property that the
corporation had acquired in a section 351 exchange or a contribution
to capital within five years of the distribution. Why, then, did
Congress apply the disqualified property limitation only to property
acquired in the latter manner? Perhaps Congress concluded that the
risk may be slightly greater if the property was acquired recently in a
• 51
section 351 exchange or through a contribution.
When the distributed property had previously been purchased by
336(d)(1)-(2) is described in Boyd C. Randall et al., The Interaction of New Section
362(e)(2) with the Loss Disallowance Rules in Corporate Liquidations, 32 CORP.
TAX'N 24 (2005). See also STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 343-44 (6th ed. 2005).
49 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. See also Yin, supra note 16, at
624-25, 629.
50 See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.
" Support for the possibility that valuation concerns were part of the
congressional purpose for adopting section 336(d) is found in the Conference
Committee's Report on the part of the 1986 Act that addressed that subsection. See
H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 11-200 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286; supra text accompanying note 38. The conferees expressed
their concern that a corporation could be utilized to create artificial losses or to inflate
the amount of losses. For reasons stated in the text above, the authors do not believe
that the disqualified property provision was adopted to deal with that concern.
Instead, the authors believe that the pro rata provision was aimed at that problem.
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the corporation from an unrelated person, the purchase price will be
deemed to equal the value of the property at that time, so the
corporation typically will need to show that the property had
subsequently declined in value in order to claim a loss deduction on
liquidation. When a corporation acquires property in a section 351
exchange, there is no purchase price to establish the value of the
property. The parties typically will set a value for the property to
determine how many shares of stock the transferor is to receive. It is
possible that the parties would set a low value on the contributed
property in order to lend credibility to a low valuation when an
anticipated liquidation of the corporation takes place. However
plausible that scenario may be, and the authors deem the likelihood to
be remote, the value the parties assigned to the property on its
acquisition by the corporation will have little weight, if any, in the
determination of the value at liquidation. Note that if the distributed
disqualified property was not undervalued at the time of its
acquisition (including if no valuation was made then), the risk of its
being undervalued at liquidation is no different for that property than
for purchased property.
If concern over valuation had been one of the reasons for the
adoption of the disqualified property provision, it would be
understandable that Congress did not apply that provision when the
depreciated property is sold to an unrelated person, because there is
no valuation issue in that case. However, as discussed below, the
authors conclude that the disqualified property provision was not
aimed at valuation issues.
Since the provision applies only when the distributed property
ends up in the hands of a related person, it might seem that the parties
would not care that an inaccurate valuation is used; but that is not
necessarily true. The undervaluation at liquidation will cause a
disproportionality in the allocation of the corporation's assets unless
the liquidating distribution is made pro rata among the shareholders.
If the shareholders are related, they may be willing to accept some
disproportionality in order to provide a tax benefit for the corporation
and the distributee. But, if there are shareholders who are not closely
related, an undervaluation of the property transferred to the
corporation will result in the transferor having a smaller interest in the
corporation than is warranted; and the undervaluation of a non-pro
rata liquidating distribution will overcompensate the shareholders to
whom that distribution is made. The transferor is likely to complain
about receiving a smaller interest in the corporation than the
contribution warrants and the other shareholders are likely to
2006]
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complain if a distributee of the depreciated property receives a larger
share of the corporation's assets than is warranted. That may not be a
problem if the contributing shareholder is the same person (or a
relation) as the person who receives the liquidating distribution
because the shortfall in the value received by the transferor may be
compensated by the excess distribution received on liquidation. But,
if the contribution is made by one shareholder and the liquidating
distribution is made to an unrelated shareholder, the resulting
disproportionality will be a strong incentive not to engage in that
scheme. Of course, if the distributions of the depreciated property are
made pro rata, none of the shareholders will suffer because of an
undervaluation of the property, so there would be no market
constraint against an undervaluation.
The disqualified property provision does not require, as a
condition of its application, that the person who transferred the
property to the corporation be the identical person (or a relative) who
receives the property in liquidation. In the absence of that identity or
a pro rata distribution, the usual arms' length consideration should
validate the valuations that are used - that is, valuations that are
agreed upon by persons acting at arms' length are generally accepted
by the Internal Revenue Service (Service) and the courts. While a
corporation and a related person may not be at arms' length to each
other, they cannot short change the minority shareholders unless the
latter acquiesce. The minority shareholders have an enforceable right
to be treated fairly and they are at arms' length to any action that is
adverse to their economic interests. The liquidating distribution to a
majority shareholder could not be undervalued without the
acquiescence of the minority shareholders. While the minority
shareholders might sleep on their rights out of ignorance or inertia,
their presence as an adverse party with veto power should be
sufficient to give credibility to the valuation.
In any event, the risk of a deliberate undervaluation taking place
at the time of the corporation's acquisition of the property likely is
small and will have little or no effect on the valuation at liquidation.
A disallowance of recognition for the entire loss that was realized on
the corporation's liquidating distribution to a related person is far too
severe and expansive a remedy for a risk of such little probability and
significance. For that reason, the authors conclude that the
congressional purpose for adopting the disqualified property provision
had no relation to valuation issues.
Even if, contrary to the authors' conclusion, restraint of
undervaluation were deemed to be one object of the disqualified
[Vol. 26:1
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property provision, there is no reason to impose that limitation if the
parties did not utilize a value that was less than the basis when the
corporation acquired the property in a section 351 exchange or
contribution. In that circumstance, a subsequent claim of a loss on
liquidation will have no more credibility than does a loss claimed on
the distribution of purchased property. There is no reason to impose
a limitation just because the distributed property was acquired in a
nonrecognition transaction.
Even in the unlikely event that Congress was concerned about the
possibility of undervaluation, there is no reason to be skeptical of
valuations that were subject to minority shareholder oversight. When
there is reason to be skeptical, the Service is not barred from
challenging the valuation. There are numerous examples in the tax
law of circumstances where valuation can become an issue (e.g., estate
and gift taxes, charitable contributions, and casualty and theft losses).
The Service and the courts deal with those issues daily. There is no
reason to conclude that the problem of valuation is peculiarly difficult
in the case of corporate liquidations. Accordingly, the authors do not
believe that valuation issues justify the disqualified property
provision; nor do the authors believe that Congress considered
valuation to be of concern in this context. The purpose and
justification of the provision must be found elsewhere and the single
purpose that comes forward is an attack on a double allowance of
recognition of a built-in loss. As noted earlier in this article, the
Conference Report on the portion of the 1986 Act that adopted
section 336(d) stressed the duplication of built-in losses as an object of
52
concern.
Note that a duplication of loss recognition is permitted and is not
deemed objectionable when the decline in value of an asset occurred
in the hands of the corporation. In that case, the decline in the
corporate asset's value will be mirrored in a similar decline in the
value of the shareholder's stock, but the duplication of losses at both
entity levels is not deemed objectionable. Only when the double
deduction is created by a transfer of a built-in loss to the corporation
does the duplication become objectionable; and, even then, in Part V
the authors question the extent to which that duplication is
52 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that
the Conference Report also mentions the concern that taxpayers might utilize
corporations to create artificial losses or to inflate the amount of losses. For the
reasons described above in the text, it is the view of the authors that the conferees
concern over valuation issues was addressed to the pro rata provision rather than to
the disqualified property provision.
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objectionable.
3. The Pro Rata Requirement of Subsection (d)(1)
The other limitation of subsection (d)(1) is the denial of a
deduction for a non-pro rata distribution to a related person.53 That
provision is not designed to prevent the doubling of losses. The
question is: what possible purpose does that provision have? One
possible purpose was to prevent the recognition of loss when the
depreciated asset remains in the hands of a related person (an
adaptation of the purpose of section 267); 54 but, if that were the
purpose, there would be no reason to permit the recognition of loss
when the asset is distributed pro rata. Instead, the limitation appears
to be aimed at the risk that the parties will undervalue the depreciated
asset in order to increase the corporation's loss."5 The provision seems
to be based on the notion that undervaluation is more likely to occur
if a related person receives a disproportionate share of the asset,
whether disproportionately larger or smaller. Since the provision
does not prevent a corporation from recognizing a loss on the sale of a
depreciated asset, even if sold pursuant to a plan of liquidation with a
distribution of sale proceeds to a related person, it appears that
Congress's focus was on the risk of undervaluation. We will examine
the merits of the pro rata provision in Part IV.C of this article. One
difficulty with ascribing a purpose to the pro rata provision is that it
operates so poorly to implement any possible purpose that its
structure seems to contradict the existence of any purpose one might
suggest.
53 I.R.C. § 336(d)(1)(A)(i). See supra note 24.
54 In Bittker and Eustice's treatise, the authors refer to the pro rata provision as
effectively reinstating section 267(a)(1)'s application to corporate liquidations.
BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 24, at 10-33. George Yin came to the same
conclusion although he conceded that the operation of the pro rata rule is not
harmonious with the operation of section 267. Yin, supra note 16, at 620-23, 628. If
that is the reason for Congress's adoption of the pro rata provision, and the authors of
this article conclude otherwise, Congress adopted a much narrower provision and one
that is inconsistent with the policy underlying section 267(a)(1). In Part IV.C, the
authors discuss the relationship of the pro rata provision to section 267(a)(1). The
authors' view is that the pro rata provision is not merely inharmonious with section
267; its operation is so at odds with the purpose and function of section 267 that it
bears no relationship to that section and was adopted for an entirely different
purpose.
55 See H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 11-200 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286; supra text accompanying notes 38, 51.
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III. THE OPERATION OF THE SECTION 362(E) LIMITATIONS ON A
CORPORATION'S USE OF BUILT-IN LOSSES
Section 836(a) of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 added
16
subsection (e) to section 362. The purposes of that amendment were
to prevent: (1) the duplication of a single economic loss in which the
same decline in value of an asset could be deducted twice, and (2) the
transfer to a U.S. corporation by a foreign person of a built-in loss in a
depreciated asset.57
A. Subsection (e)(1)
Section 362(e) deals with two separate circumstances in which
built-in losses are transferred to a domestic corporation. The first of
these is addressed in subsection (e)(1). Section 362(e)(1) deals with
the transfer of depreciated property to a domestic corporation by a
person who is not subject to United States taxation (i.e., generally a
foreign person) as part of either a contribution to the corporation, a
section 351 exchange, or a corporate reorganization. If the aggregate
basis of the transferred property exceeds the aggregate fair market
value of those properties, the corporation's basis in each of the
properties that were transferred by that person (both appreciated and
depreciated properties) will equal the fair market value of that
property. Apparently, Congress concluded that since it was
precluding the transfer of built-in losses when there is a net built-in
loss, it was only fair to remove the built-in gain of appreciated
properties that were acquired by the corporation in the same
transaction since the total amount of appreciation of such transferred
properties is offset by an equal amount of depreciation of the other
transferred properties. This statutory adjustment to basis applies for
all purposes so that the new basis will be used to measure both gains
and losses. The circumstance in which this provision applies is
referred to as the "importation of a net built-in loss."' 8
56 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 836, 118 Stat.
1418, 1594-96 (2004).
57 CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH (JOBS) ACT, S.
REP. No. 108-192, pt. 1, at IV-C1 (2003). The investigative report on the Enron
Corporation was the source of Congress's attention to this issue. Id.
58 I.R.C. § 362(e)(1)(A). Section 836(b) of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 adopted a similar provision for the circumstance where a domestic corporation
receives property with a net built-in loss from a foreign corporation pursuant to a
liquidation under section 332. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 836, 118 Stat. 1418, 1594-96; see
also I.R.C. § 334(b)(1)(B).
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Subsection (e)(1) does not involve a duplication of loss, but rather
involves the transfer of a depreciated asset from a person whose loss
on the disposition of that asset would have no U.S. tax consequence to
a domestic corporation that could use the loss as a deduction from its
U.S. taxable income. The 2004 amendment prevents that importation
of a built-in loss. However, a built-in loss can be transferred by a
foreign person if the aggregate basis of the properties transferred by
that person does not exceed the aggregate value of those properties.
In that case, all of the built-in loss that is transferred is effectively
offset by built-in gain that is transferred and there is no abuse.
B. Subsection (e)(2)
Congress was not concerned solely with transfers of built-in losses
by foreign persons. The Senate Committee's Report to the 2004 Act
states with regard to the adoption of section 362(e):
The Joint Committee on Taxation staff's investigative report
of the Enron Corporation and other information reveal that
taxpayers are engaging in various tax motivated transactions
to duplicate a single economic loss and subsequently, deduct
such loss more than once. Congress has previously taken
actions to limit the ability of taxpayers to engage in specific
transactions that purport to duplicate a single economic loss.
However, new schemes that purport to duplicate losses
continue to proliferate.... [T]he Committee believes that a
single economic loss should not be deducted more than once.
Thus, the Committee believes that it is generally appropriate
to limit a corporation's basis in property acquired in a tax-free
transfer to the fair market value of such property. In
addition, the Committee believes that it is appropriate to
prevent the importation of economic losses into the U.S. tax
system if such losses arose prior to the assets becoming
subject to the U.S. tax system.59
Subsection (e)(2) deals only with transfers of depreciated
property to a corporation either in a section 351 exchange or as a
contribution from a shareholder to the corporation.6 The general rule
59 CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH (JOBS) ACT, S.
REP. No. 108-192, pt. 1, at IV-C1 (2003) (citation omitted).
60 In this article, the authors focus on section 351 exchanges, but the same
considerations apply to contributions made by a shareholder to a corporation's
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is that a corporation's basis in property it acquired in a section 351
exchange or as a contribution to capital is the same as the basis that
the transferor had in that property increased by any gain the
61transferor recognized. Subsection (e) establishes an exception to
62that determination of basis.
Subsection (e)(2) applies if the aggregate adjusted basis of the
properties transferred by a transferor is greater than the aggregate fair
• 61
market value of the transferred properties. In that case, the
corporation's basis in the transferred properties is reduced by that
difference. This reduction of the corporation's basis is allocated
among the depreciated transferred properties in proportion to their
built-in loss immediately before the transfer took place. Thus, while
the aggregate basis of the acquired properties will equal their
aggregate fair market value, some of the properties can be
appreciated and some can be depreciated. The corporation's new
basis is used for all purposes, including to measure both gains and
losses. The operation of subsection (e)(2) is illustrated in Part IV of
this article.
However, in the case of a section 351 exchange, the corporation's
basis in the transferred properties will not be reduced if the transferor
and the corporation elect to have the transferor's basis in the stock
received in the exchange limited to its fair market value immediately
capital. A shareholder's contribution to a corporation will increase the shareholder's
basis in the stock of the corporation that the shareholder holds by the amount of the
basis of the contributed property. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1). If a person who is not a
shareholder makes a contribution of property in kind to a corporation, the
corporation will have a zero basis in the contributed property. I.R.C. § 362(c)(1).
61 I.R.C. § 362(a). See supra note 26.
62 I.R.C. § 362(e).
63 The provision applies to each transferor separately rather than to the control
group, if any, as a whole. As noted by Jasper Cummings and Robert Hanson:
Although there is some confusion on the point, it seems that the provision
is to be applied to each separate transferor, even though several persons
(the control group) may have transferred property in a section 351
exchange for control of the transferee corporation. The statute seems to
say that fairly clearly. However, the Senate report stated that the rule
applied only if the properties contributed by the control group in the
aggregate carried a net built-in loss, and the conference report repeated
that statement in describing the Senate bill and said that the Senate bill was
followed with modifications but did not refer again to this issue.
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. & Robert P. Hanson, New Limitations on Corporate Built-In
Losses, 107 TAx NOTES 1553, 1562 (June 20, 2005).
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after the exchange. 64 Thus, instead of reducing the corporation's basis
in the transferred properties, the parties can elect to limit the
transferor's basis in the stocks received in the exchange. 65 This
election reflects that Congress was not concerned with the shifting of a
potential loss from the transferor to the corporation, but was
concerned exclusively with preventing the duplication of a loss
deduction.
Example 2. M, a U.S. citizen, owned machinery having a fair
market value of $30,000 and subject to an encumbrance in the
amount of $10,000. Thus, the net value of the encumbered
machinery was $20,000. M's basis in the machinery was
$40,000, so the machinery was depreciated property. M
organized the X Corporation and transferred the machinery
to X for 10 shares of X's stock having a value of $20,000. X
took the machinery subject to the $10,000 encumbrance. The
exchange qualified for nonrecognition under section 351. If
no election under section 362(e)(2)(C) were made, M would
have a basis of $30,000 in the 10 shares of X stock - i.e., M's
basis in the stock equals his $40,000 basis in the machinery
66less the $10,000 encumbrance on that property. In the
absence of an election, X's $40,000 basis in the machinery will
be reduced by $10,000 pursuant to section 362(e)(2), so X will
have a $30,000 basis in the machinery. Instead, M and X elect
to limit M's basis in the stock to its fair market value of
$20,000 pursuant to section 362(e)(2)(C). Because of the
election, X will have a $40,000 basis in the machinery and
thus a $10,000 built-in loss.
The operation of the section 362(e)(2)(C) election in the example
above is consistent with the purpose of subsection (e)(2). Since the
transferor's basis in the stock equals its fair market value, there will be
no duplication of a built-in loss. Congress was not adverse to the
shifting of the $10,000 built-in loss from M to the X corporation, but
only with preventing a duplication of the loss.
I.R.C. § 362(e)(2)(C). The election is made by including it in the tax return
for the taxable year in which the section 351 exchange took place. I.R.C. §
362(e)(2)(C)(ii).
65 Guidance for the procedures for making this election is provided in I.R.S.
Notice 2005-70, 2005-41 I.R.B. 694.
66 I.R.C. § 358(a)(1), (d).
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IV. THE FLAWS IN SECTION 336(D)(1)-(2) AND THE REASONS THESE
PROVISIONS SHOULD BE REPEALED
Without regard to the effect of the 2004 adoption of section
362(e), the section 336(d)(1)-(2) provisions are poorly designed and
operate badly. Even before section 362(e) was enacted, those
provisions were flawed because there was no convincing rationale for
the scope of their application - that is, there seems to be no
meaningful distinction between liquidating distributions and related
sales that are subject to those provisions and liquidating distributions
and related sales that are not. After the adoption of section 362(e),
the arbitrariness of those provisions remained; and, to make matters
worse, there are circumstances in which the application of those
limitations causes inequitable tax consequences that unfairly punish
some taxpayers and other circumstances in which those limitations
became moot.
A. Section 336(d) (2) - The Anti-Stuffing Provision
As already noted, the anti-stuffing provision of subsection (d)(2)
applies only if a liquidation was anticipated at the time that the
depreciated property was acquired by the corporation and, even then,
only if a principal purpose of the acquisition was for the corporation
to recognize the built-in loss in connection with the anticipated
liquidation. The combination of a recognition of the built-in loss by
the corporation and a liquidation of the corporation makes it likely
that both the shareholder who transferred the property to the
corporation and the corporation itself would recognize a loss for the
same decline in value of the acquired property. However, if there
were no plan to liquidate the acquiring corporation, but there was a
plan to have the corporation recognize a loss by disposing of the
depreciated asset or by utilizing larger depreciation deductions
because of the excess basis in the asset, there would exist the same
potential for doubling of the loss (i.e., a doubling of the use of the
excess basis). The difference between the liquidation and
nonliquidation circumstance is that, in the case of a liquidation, there
is assurance that the shareholder will soon recognize the built-in loss.
In contrast, if there is no liquidation planned, the shareholder would
have to sell the acquired shares in order to recognize a loss or hold
them until the corporation is liquidated. The potential difference in
the timing of the transferor's recognition of the built-in loss does not
appear to the authors to warrant providing such significantly different
tax consequences.
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Another flaw in the operation of subsection (d)(2) is that it does
not bar the use of the excess basis (i.e., the excess of basis over value)
to prevent the recognition of gain on appreciation of the depreciated
property that takes place after the property was acquired by the
corporation. While there is a difference between using excess basis to
prevent gain recognition on the same asset and using it to create a loss
deduction, there is reason to question whether that difference
warrants such disparate tax treatment. It is noteworthy that section
362(e) reduces a depreciated property's basis for both gain and loss
measurement purposes. However, subsection (d)(2) is not the only
tax provision that disfavors loss recognition and permits offsets
against appreciation. For example, when depreciated property is
given to a donee, section 1015 prevents the donee from realizing the
built-in loss, but permits the donee to use the excess basis to prevent
the recognition of gain for subsequent appreciation of the donated
67property.
If the double allowance of a loss deduction was a loophole, it was
not entirely closed by subsection (d)(2). Eight years after adopting
subsection (d)(2), Congress added section 362(e) to the Code which
addresses the doubling of loss deductions regardless of whether there
was a plan to liquidate the corporation. There also is no time frame
requirement in section 362(e) and it applies for purposes of measuring
the amount of both gains and losses. In those respects, section 362(e)
is a broader provision than subsection (d)(2); we will consider below
whether it swallows subsection (d)(2) and renders it meaningless.
Not only is section 336(d)(2) limited to circumstances in which a
plan of liquidation is contemplated, it will apply to relatively few such
circumstances. Virtually no case in which a plan of liquidation is
adopted more than two years after the corporation's acquisition of the
depreciated property will be subject to the limitation.68 Even when a
plan is adopted within two years after the acquisition, there are
69numerous circumstances in which the limitation will not apply.
Congress was reluctant in 1986 to impose the (d)(2) type of limitation
broadly; but, in 2004, Congress greatly expanded the reach of that
67 However, in the case of section 1015, only one party (the donee) will use the
excess basis.
68 See H.R. REP. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-200 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286; BLUE BOOK, supra note 24, at 343; supra text accompanying
note 32.
69 See H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-201 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286; BLUE BOOK, supra note 24, at 344; supra text
accompanying note 31.
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type of limitation when it adopted section 362(e). We will see that
while the 2004 amendment to the Code did not render subsection
(d)(2) meaningless, it did severely restrict the circumstances in which
that limitation could have any consequence and caused subsection
(d)(2) to impose harsh and inappropriate treatment in the few
circumstances in which it continues to have an effect.
At first blush, it might seem that subsection (d)(2) could not have
any impact once section 362(e) was adopted. To the contrary, there
are two (and only two) circumstances in which subsection (d)(2) can
still be of consequence. Let us first consider the effect that section
362(e)(2) has on the (d)(2) limitation. Consider the following
illustration:
Example 3. G, a U.S. citizen, is the sole shareholder of the Y
Corporation. G transferred Whiteacre (unimproved land) to
Y in a section 351 exchange for 10 shares of Y's common
stock having a fair market value of $100,000. G had a basis of
$210,000 in Whiteacre, which had a fair market value of
$100,000 at the time of the exchange. Under section 358, G's
basis in the 10 shares it acquired is $210,000. While, in the
absence of limitations, section 362(a) would provide Y with a
basis of $210,000 in Whiteacre, section 362(e)(2) will limit Y's
basis in Whiteacre to the property's fair market value of
$100,000. This limitation of Y's basis in Whiteacre would not
apply if an election were made under section 362(e)(2)(C) to
limit G's basis in the 10 shares of stock; but no election was
made.70 The $100,000 basis that Y acquires in Whiteacre
applies for all purposes so that it will not matter whether Y
liquidates or whether the value of Whiteacre rises or falls.
The effect of the section 362(e)(2) provision is to prevent the
corporation from obtaining a tax benefit for a built-in loss
obtained in a section 351 exchange while allowing the
transferor to retain the built-in loss by transferring it to the
stock that was received in the exchange. Thus, only a single
tax benefit will be allowed for the built-in loss.
If a principal purpose of the section 351 exchange was for Y
70 If G were a foreigner, Y's basis in Whiteacre would be $100,000; but, in that
case, section 362(e)(1) would be the applicable provision and there would be no
provision for an election to alter the transferor's stock basis in lieu of limiting the
corporation's basis.
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to recognize a loss in connection with a liquidation and if Y
distributed Whiteacre to G as a liquidating distribution less
than two years later, section 336(d)(2) would apply to limit
Y's basis in Whiteacre to $100,000 for purposes of measuring
any loss recognized by Y on the distribution; but section
362(e)(2) already established Y's basis in Whiteacre at
$100,000, so the (d)(2) limitation is of no consequence.
Example 3 shows that if all the properties transferred by a
shareholder to the corporation are depreciated and if no section
362(e)(2)(C) election is made, then section 336(d)(2) has no
significance regardless of whether the transferor is a U.S. citizen or a
foreigner. Section 336(d)(2) has no effect on the transaction.
However, if the shareholder transferred a mix of both appreciated and
depreciated properties to the corporation or if the parties make an
election under section 362(e)(2)(C) to limit the basis of the
shareholder's stock, then section 336(d)(2) can have an effect. Those
are the only two circumstances in which subsection (d)(2) can have
any significance. Examples 4 through 7 below illustrate how that
occurs and why the consequences of applying subsection (d)(2) are
undesirable.
Example 4. Assume the same facts as those stated in
Example 3 except that G and Y elect under section
362(e)(2)(C) to limit G's basis in the 10 shares of Y stock to
their $100,000 fair market value. In that case, if section
336(d)(2) does not apply, Y's basis in Whiteacre will be
$210,000. The obvious purpose of allowing that election is to
protect the goal of permitting only one deduction for a built-
in loss while permitting the transferor to shift the loss
deduction to the corporation. If Y sells Whiteacre for
$100,000 (its value), Y will recognize a loss of $110,000
($210,000 basis minus the $100,000 selling price). If G sells
the 10 shares of Y stock for their value of $100,000, G will not
recognize a gain or loss.
What happens if Y liquidates within two years, sells
Whiteacre at a time when the fair market value of Whiteacre
is $100,000, and if section 336(d)(2) is held to apply to that
sale? Subsection (d)(2) would reduce Y's basis in Whiteacre
by the $110,000 built-in loss. Y distributes the $100,000
proceeds of that sale to G. Neither Y nor G would recognize
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a gain or loss since Y has a $100,000 basis in Whiteacre and G
has a $100,000 basis in the 10 shares of stock. The
consequence of applying subsection (d)(2) is that neither the
transferor G nor the Y Corporation recognizes a loss. The
purpose of both section 336(d)(2) and 362(e)(2) is to prevent
the doubling of a built-in loss deduction; they were not
intended to prevent a single deduction of the loss. Given the
existence of section 362(e)(2), the application of section
336(d)(2) causes a harsh and undesirable result.
One might contend that since subsection (d)(2) has a subjective
element to it, the Service and courts should find that the transfer of
property to a corporation cannot have the proscribed purpose if a
section 362(e)(2)(C) election is made. But, the proscribed purpose is
only to have the corporation recognize a loss in connection with a
liquidation. There is no requirement that the purpose be to double
the recognition of the loss or that the transaction have a tax avoidance
motive. While the prevention of tax avoidance through doubling the
recognition of a loss is the reason that Congress adopted subsection
(d)(2), Congress did not expressly provide that the statute applies only
if the transaction was motivated by tax avoidance or a plan for the
double use of a property's built-in loss.
The fact that there will be only a single recognition of a loss
because of the application of the section 362(e)(2)(C) election may
influence a court or the Service to be more lenient in finding that the
proscribed purpose was not present, but the literal language of the
statute makes no provision for such treatment. Perhaps, the Service
or a court will graft an exception to section 336(d)(2) when there is no
double deduction at stake on the ground that such an exception is
consistent with the policy for adopting the subsection (d)(2)
limitation; but one cannot be confident that will occur.
In sum, when a section 362(e)(2)(C) election has been made,
section 336(d)(2) is, at best, superfluous, and, at worst, harmful.
Another situation in which section 336(d)(2) can still have an
effect is where a transferor transfers a mix of appreciated and
depreciated assets to a corporation. Section 362(e)(2) reduces the
basis of the depreciated assets the corporation acquired only by the
net built-in loss - i.e., by the excess of the aggregate basis of the
transferred assets over the aggregate fair market value of those assets.
So, the basis of depreciated assets will not be reduced by that
provision to the extent of the amount of aggregate appreciation in the
appreciated assets that were transferred. If the aggregate amount of
2006]
28 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 26:1
appreciation equals or exceeds the aggregate amount of depreciation,
there will be no reduction of the corporation's basis in the depreciated
assets.
In contrast, section 336(d)(2) applies to each depreciated asset
individually. So, a mix of appreciated and depreciated assets will have
no effect on the reduction of basis for each depreciated asset if section
336(d)(2) applies. We will illustrate how that operates in several
examples below and then we will consider whether it is undesirable
for section 336(d)(2) to apply in those circumstances.
Example 5. In a section 351 exchange, K (a U.S. citizen)
transferred properties to the Z Corporation in exchange for
100 shares of Z's common stock having a fair market value of
$550,000. K is the sole shareholder of Z. There were five
properties transferred by K to Z in that exchange. The five
properties and their adjusted bases and values at the time of
the exchange were:
Asset Basis FMV
Land 1 $80,000 $100,000
Land 2 $120,000 $90,000
Building $200,000 $130,000
Corporate Stocks $50,000 $105,000
Patent $100,000 $125,000
TOTAL $550,000 $550,000
Since the aggregate basis of the properties transferred by K
do not exceed the aggregate fair market value of those
properties, section 362(e)(2) is not applicable; and Z's basis in
each of the five properties is the same as the basis that K had
in those assets.
Even though the built-in loss of Land 2 and the Building was
passed to the corporation, there is no tax abuse in this situation
because the built-in losses are offset by the built-in gains that were
transferred to Z. If K were to sell his 100 shares of Z stock for their
value of $550,000, he would not recognize a gain or loss since his basis
in the stock also was $550,000. K's basis in the stock reflects the fact
that the $100,000 of built-in loss that he retained from Land 2 and the
Building is offset by the $100,000 of built-in gain that he also retained
from Land 1, the Corporate Stocks, and the Patent. Similarly, Z's
acquisition of a $100,000 built-in loss is offset by Z's acquisition of
$100,000 of unrealized appreciation. While Z could promptly sell the
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depreciated Land 2 and the Building (and thereby recognize a loss of
$100,000) and could continue to hold the other three properties so as
not to recognize the unrealized appreciation of those properties, there
still is no abuse in that situation because there is no overall doubling
of a loss. The corporation's ability to accelerate the recognition of its
loss while delaying the recognition of its gains is the same power that
any taxpayer, who has a mix of appreciated and depreciated
properties, possesses. There is no reason to regard Z's position any
differently or to impose any special tax treatment on Z and the
current version of section 362(e)(2) properly leaves the parties
untouched.
One might question why the transfer of unrealized appreciation
should offset the transfer of unrealized depreciation only if the
transfers were made by the same transferor as part of the same
transaction. For example, if K were to transfer appreciated property
to Y corporation in Year One, and transfer depreciated property to Y
in Year Three, the built-in loss of the depreciated property will cause
a reduction of Y's basis in that property without any offset for
appreciation of property previously or subsequently placed into the
corporation by K. The apparent reason for not offsetting in that
circumstance is administrative burden. While it would be possible to
keep track of transfers of appreciated and depreciated properties that
were made over a period of years by a single transferor, it would
impose an administrative burden to do so. The burden would be
especially heavy when appreciated property was transferred to the
corporation after the reduced basis of previously contributed
depreciated property had caused tax consequences (e.g., if the
depreciated property had previously been sold or if depreciation
deductions had been taken). If the change in basis caused by the
offset of the appreciated property were to be applied retroactively,
there could be difficulty in adjusting the tax consequences that were
previously reported.
Example 6. Assume the same facts as those stated in
Example 5. One year after the section 351 exchange took
place, Z sold Land 2 and Building to an unrelated person and
Z distributed the proceeds of that sale and the remaining
three properties to K as liquidating distributions. The
properties had the same values at the time of the sale and
liquidation as they had one year earlier. Section 336(d)(2)
could apply to the sale of Land 2 and the Building, depending
upon the purpose the parties had for transferring the
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properties to Z. If section 336(d)(2) applies, Z's basis in Land
2 will be reduced to $90,000 and Z's basis in the Building will
be reduced to $130,000. Therefore Z will not realize or
recognize any loss on the sale of those two properties.
However, Z will recognize a gain of $100,000 (total $330,000
sales price minus the total $230,000 basis) on the liquidating
distribution of its other three properties. K will not recognize
a gain or loss since the amount K received for his stock
equaled the basis of the stock.
Congress made the decision in adopting section 362(e) to allow a
corporation to deduct built-in losses acquired in a section 351
exchange to the extent that such built-in losses were offset by the
acquisition of unrealized appreciation from the same transferor at the
same time. There is no apparent justification for denying a
corporation the recognition of such losses only when they are incurred
in the context of a liquidation and then only in very limited
circumstances. The continued existence of section 336(d)(2) provides
no useful supplement to section 362(e) and actually contravenes the
congressional scheme that section 362(e) reflects.
As noted in connection with the section 362(e)(2)(C) election, it is
possible that the Service or a court will not apply the subsection (d)(2)
provision in this circumstance. That possibility appears unlikely in
this context, however, because there is a doubling of loss recognition
when each depreciated asset is viewed individually - i.e., the
congressional decision in subsection (d)(2) not to take into account a
simultaneous transfer of appreciated property makes the presence of
appreciated property and the treatment accorded it by section 362(e)
irrelevant to the application of subsection (d)(2). In any event, if the
courts were to exclude all transactions that fit within section 362(e)
from the application of section 336(d)(2), there still would be no
reason to retain subsection (d)(2) because it would have no
circumstance in which it could be of consequence.
Example 7. Assume the same facts as those stated in
Example 5 except that the fair market value of the corporate
stocks that K transferred to Z is only $75,000 instead of the
$105,000 stated in that example. The aggregate basis of the
transferred assets will still be $550,000. But the aggregate fair
market value of the transferred assets will be only $520,000.
Since the aggregate basis exceeds the aggregate fair market
value of the transferred properties by $30,000, section
362(e)(2) requires that the aggregate basis of those assets be
[Vol. 26:1
Preventions of Double Deductions
reduced by that $30,000 net built-in loss. The $30,000
reduction of basis is allocated between Land 2 and the
Building (the two depreciated assets) according to the
amount of their built-in loss. The built-in loss of Land 2 is
$30,000 (i.e., that is the amount by which Land 2 is a
depreciated asset) and the built-in loss of the Building is
$70,000, for a total built-in loss of $100,000. So, 30% of the
$30,000 reduction is applied to Land 2 which therefore has a
basis of $111,000 ($120,000 minus $9,000). The remaining
70% of the $30,000 reduction is applied to the building which
therefore has a basis of $179,000 ($200,000 minus $21,000).
Note that section 362(e) does not make the basis of each of
the corporation's assets equal its value. To the contrary,
three of the corporation's five assets are appreciated and two
are depreciated.
Congress chose in section 362(e)(2) to eliminate a loss deduction
for a corporate transferee of depreciated property only to the extent
that the section 351 exchange created the prospect for a net double
deduction. However, if a plan of liquidation of the corporation is
adopted within two years after the exchange, any loss the corporation
realizes on depreciated property could be altered by section 336(d)(2).
As noted above, this frustrates the path that Congress chose in section
362(e)(2); thus, section 336(d)(2) should be repealed to prevent its
conflict with the operation of section 362(e). There is no reason to
seek to cure this problem by amending section 336(d)(2) because that
provision has consequence only in circumstances in which it conflicts
with the policy of section 362(e).7
Example 8. Assume the same facts as those stated in
Example 7 except that K is a foreign individual and thus is not
subject to the U.S. tax. In this case, section 362(e)(1) is
applicable rather than section 362(e)(2). Since there is a net
built-in loss, section 362(e)(1) makes Z's basis in each of the
transferred properties equal to the fair market value of that
property. Consequently, there is no unrealized appreciation
or depreciation in Z's hands. Section 336(d)(2) is of no
consequence since there is no asset with a built-in loss in Z's
hands. However, if the aggregate unrealized appreciation of
the properties that K transferred to Z equaled or exceeded
71 In their article on this topic, Randall, Spilker, and Werlhof also recommend
the repeal of section 336(d)(2). Randall et al., supra note 48, at 32.
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the aggregate unrealized depreciation of other properties that
K transferred, section 362(e) would not apply. Section
336(d)(2) could then apply to the depreciated properties. As
noted in the above discussion of Example 7, the application of
section 336(d)(2) in that situation is inappropriate because it
conflicts with an essential element of the policy underlying
section 362(e).
B. The Disqualified Property Provision of Section 336(d)(1)
As previously discussed, the principal, and probably the exclusive,
reason that Congress adopted the disqualified property limitation was
to prevent the doubling of the recognition of a built-in loss that was
transferred to a corporation as part of a section 351 exchange or a
contribution to capital.72 For reasons set forth in Part II.C.2, the
authors reject the suggestion that the disqualified property provision
is also aimed at preventing the parties from deliberately undervaluing
assets distributed in liquidation to related persons. While operating
quite differently, the congressional purpose for the disqualified
property provision is therefore the same as the purpose that led to the
adoption of sections 336(d)(2) and 362(e)(2). Unlike those latter two
provisions, the disqualified property provision does not require that
the property transferred to the corporation have been depreciated at
the time of the corporation's acquisition. It is sufficient that the
property have been acquired in a section 351 exchange or contribution
within five years of the liquidating distribution and that it be
depreciated at the time of distribution to a related person.
This provision prevents the recognition of a loss that a
corporation realized on making a liquidating distribution of
depreciated disqualified property to a related person. The provision
utilizes an objective standard for determining its applicability; the
purposes and intentions of the parties do not matter.
The disqualified property provision is poorly designed to deal
with the double loss recognition issue or, for that matter, to deal with
any other issue one might imagine. The provision disallows a
deduction for an asset's decline in value that took place in the hands
of the liquidating corporation. It would be reasonable for Congress to
deny a deduction for any loss incurred in making a liquidating
distribution, as Congress did in section 311(a) for nonliquidating
distributions. But, Congress chose to allow a corporation to deduct
12 See supra Part 1I.C.2.
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losses recognized on making a liquidating distribution of depreciated
property.73 The limitations that Congress imposed on that deduction
should reflect some rational policy, but none is apparent in the case of
the disqualified property provision. There is no justification for
denying a deduction for losses realized on the liquidating distribution
of property that was not a depreciated asset 4 when it was acquired by
the corporation. Even if an asset was depreciated at the time it was
acquired by the corporation, there is no justification for denying a
deduction for the loss attributable to further declines in value that
occurred in the hands of the corporation. A decline in value of a
corporate asset that occurs while the corporation holds that asset will
cause a corresponding decline in the value of the shareholders' stock
and will thus result in a double deduction; but the double deduction is
not created by a transfer of a built-in loss - the evil at which the
disqualified property provision is aimed.
If a corporation purchased an asset that subsequently became
depreciated because of a decline in value, the corporation could
recognize a loss by making a liquidating pro rata distribution of that
asset. If, instead, the corporation acquired the asset in a section 351
exchange at a time when the asset's fair market value was no less than
its basis, the corporation could not recognize a loss. There is no
reason that the question of whether to allow a deduction for the loss
incurred on its distribution to a related person should be resolved any
differently from the treatment of a purchased asset. Consider the
following illustrations:
Example 9. In Year One, the X Corporation acquired Land 1
and Land 2. X purchased Land 1 from an unrelated party for
its fair market value and therefore X's initial basis in Land 1
equaled its then fair market value. So, Land 1 was neither
appreciated nor depreciated when X acquired it. X acquired
Land 2 from a shareholder in a section 351 exchange. At the
time that X acquired Land 2, its basis and fair market value
were equal. So, Land 2 was neither an appreciated nor a
depreciated asset when X acquired it.
In Year Four, X was liquidated and distributed all of its
73 I.R.C. § 336(a).
74 You will recall that the term "depreciated asset" refers to an asset whose basis
is greater than its fair market value. See supra note 8.
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assets, including Land I and Land 2, to its sole shareholder."
At that time, both Land 1 and Land 2 had depreciated in
value, so X realized a loss on the distribution of both
properties. X is permitted by the Code to recognize and
deduct the loss it realized on the distribution of Land 1.76
However, the disqualified property provision of section
336(d)(1) prevents the recognition of a loss on the
distribution of Land 2 and thus denies X a deduction for the
loss it realized on that distribution. There is no good reason
why the distribution of Land 2 should be treated differently
than the treatment accorded to the distribution of Land 1.
Example 10. In 1999, Y Corporation acquired Land 3 in a
section 351 exchange. At the time of acquisition, Y obtained a
basis of $100,000 in Land 3 which had a fair market value of
$80,000. 77 So, Land 3 had depreciated in the amount of
$20,000. Y was liquidated in the year 2000 and Y distributed
Land 3 to its sole shareholder. At the time of distribution, the
fair market value of Land 3 was $50,000 and Y's basis in the
property was still $100,000. If section 336(d)(2) were to apply
to the transaction, it would reduce Y's basis to $80,000,
leaving Y with a $30,000 loss on making the liquidating
distribution. But, the disqualified property provision of
section 336(d)(1) prevents Y's recognition of any loss on the
distribution, so Y will have no deduction. When subsections
(d)(1)-(2) both apply to a liquidating distribution, subsection
78(d)(1) has priority. There is no reason to disallow any more
of I's loss than the $20,000 that was built-in at the time that Y
acquired the property. That is the amount that would be
disallowed by section 336(d)(2) if it were applicable and it is
the amount that would be disallowed by section 362(e)(2) if it
were applicable to the year in question. The disqualified
property provision denies recognition to too large an amount.
75 Since the distributions were made to a sole shareholder, they were pro rata;
and the pro rata requirement of section 336(d)(1) was satisfied.
76 Section 267(a)(1) does not prevent a deduction of the recognized loss because
that provision does not apply to losses recognized in a distribution made pursuant to
the complete liquidation of a corporation.
77 Since section 362(e)(2) was adopted in 2004, it does not apply to the 1999
acquisition of Land 3.
78 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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The disqualified property provision is an even worse provision
than section 336(d)(2). The only circumstance in which it can be said
to operate properly is when it denies recognition for that amount of
net loss that is attributable to the net amount of depreciation that
existed when the assets were acquired by the corporation. That
amount of built-in net loss now, however, is dealt with by section
362(e)(2). So, the provision serves no useful purpose and often
applies in circumstances where it reaches improper results. For
example, in Example 6, if Z had distributed Land 2 and Building to K
in liquidation, instead of selling those properties and distributing the
proceeds, the disqualified property provision would have prevented Z
from deducting its loss on that distribution even though Z would
recognize a gain on its distribution of the other three properties. The
disqualified property provision is worse than subsection (d)(2)
because it can apply to a wider range of circumstances and therefore is
capable of causing more mischief.
Section 362(e)(2) does not apply to a corporation's built-in loss
that was acquired in a section 351 exchange if an election was made to
limit the basis of the shareholder's stock or to the extent that there
was a mix of appreciated and depreciated property acquired by the
transferee corporation in the exchange.7 9 The application of the
disqualified property provision to built-in losses that section 362(e)(2)
does not reach because of either of those exceptions is improper and
harmful for the reasons spelled out in the discussion of section
336(d)(2) in Part IV.A above.
Independent of its conflict with part of the policy of section
362(e)(2), the disqualified property provision is poorly designed. To
the extent that the disqualified property provision denies a deduction
for built-in losses, there is a question as to why it should be restricted
to distributions to related persons. In that respect, it can be seen as
too narrow. To the extent that the disqualified property provision
applies to anything other than built-in losses, it is too broad. The
provision should be repealed.
C. The Pro Rata Provision of Section 336(d)(1)
The pro rata provision is not aimed at preventing the doubling of
recognition of a loss. Superficially, its purpose appears to be to apply
to corporate liquidations a more modest version of section 267(a)(1),
which denies a deduction for a loss recognized on a sale or exchange
79 See supra Part III.B.
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between related persons.Y The pro rata provision, however, is not
simply a narrower and modified version of section 267(a)(1). To the
contrary, it operates in a manner that bears no relation to section
267(a)(1) and is inconsistent with the likely reason that section
267(a)(1) was adopted.
The apparent purpose of section 267(a)(1) is to prevent the
recognition of unrealized depreciation when the property remains in
the hands of a person who bears a close relationship to the taxpayer.
The realization of a loss generally requires, as a minimum, a
separation of the property from the taxpayer. The underlying theory
of section 267(a)(1) is that when depreciated property is sold to a
related person, the separation is not sufficient to permit a loss
deduction to be taken at that time. Stating it differently, the group of
related persons is regarded as a single person for that purpose and no
loss will be allowed so long as the property remains within that group.
The loss deduction that is disallowed by section 267(a)(1) is not
excluded permanently. Instead, the disallowed loss is deferred and
can be used to offset gain that the transferee realizes on a subsequent
disposition of the property.8' The deferral will be permanent if the
property does not appreciate in value in the hands of the transferee
since the disallowed loss can be used only to prevent gain recognition
for appreciation that arises in the hands of the transferee. However,
the statute does leave open the possibility that the disallowed loss will
be utilized by the transferee at a later date.
Compare the operation of section 267(a)(1) with the pro rata
provision. Under the latter provision, the corporation can recognize
and deduct the loss that it realizes on making a liquidating distribution
of depreciated property to a related person provided that the
distribution constitutes the related person's proportionate share of the
distributed property. If the liquidating distribution to the related
person is greater or less than that person's proportionate share, then
the distributing corporation will not recognize the loss it realized on
that distribution. This provision has nothing to do with the separation
of depreciated property from a group of related persons. There need
be no separation of the property from the group so long as the related
so As previously noted, section 267(a)(1) does not apply to distributions made in
complete liquidation of a corporation. The gain or loss realized on a liquidating
distribution is equivalent to the gain or loss realized from a sale or exchange of
property. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
81 I.R.C. § 267(d). Only gain realized by the original transferee on a subsequent
disposition of the transferred asset (or of certain replacement assets) can be excluded
by section 267(d). Treas. Reg. §§ 1.267(d)-l(a)(3), (4), Exs. (1)-(4) (1960).
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person receives his proportionate share of the distribution. This
treatment conflicts with the section 267 purpose to disallow a
deduction for a loss when ownership of the property remains within
the group of related persons. The rationale for the adoption of
section 267(a)(1) has no relevance to the adoption of the pro rata
provision.
Moreover, if a liquidating distribution of depreciated property to
a related person is not pro rata, then section 336(d)(1) permanently
prevents any deduction for the corporation's loss. The shareholder's
basis in the distributed property will equal its fair market value82 and
any gain the shareholder may realize from subsequent appreciation of
the property will be recognized unless realized in a nonrecognition
transaction. There is no potential deferral of the disallowed loss. In
that regard also, the pro rata provision is unlike section 267(a)(1). If,
contrary to the authors' conclusion, a purpose of the pro rata
provision is to emulate section 267(a)(1), it does a remarkably poor
job of it.
What then could possibly be the congressional purpose for
adopting the pro rata provision? In Part II.C.3, the authors suggest
that the purpose of the provision is to remove the risk that the
corporation and the related person would conspire to undervalue the
property distributed to that person in order to provide a tax benefit to
the distributing corporation. If that is the reason for the provision, it
is difficult to see why the limitation does not apply to proportionate
distributions. Indeed, to the extent that minority shareholders might
be a check on a corporation's wish to undervalue a distribution to a
related person, they would have no reason to object if all the
shareholders received a proportionate share of the property. If the
distributee is the sole shareholder of the corporation, the risk of
undervaluation is even greater than that with disproportionate
distributions; but the statute does not apply to the former situation.
In short, if the provision is aimed at valuation issues, as the authors
believe it to be, it nevertheless is badly designed.
We can only speculate as to the purpose of the pro rata provision.
It is especially difficult to determine that purpose since the provision
applies so imperfectly, and even irrationally, to any purpose one might
choose for it. Regardless of what purpose the provision might have, it
is badly designed and rife with arbitrary distinctions. The provision
should be significantly revised or, preferably, repealed.
82 I.R.C. § 334(a).
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V. To WHAT EXTENT IS IT IMPROPER TO ALLOW Two
DEDUCTIONS FOR A SINGLE Loss?
As previously noted, in a nonrecognition exchange between a
corporation and another party, there typically will be a duplication of
83basis. In the case of depreciated property, this results in a
duplication of a built-in loss and therefore a potential duplication of a
loss deduction. That is, both the corporation and the other party have
the potential to utilize the excess basis. The manner in which this
duplication occurs is described and illustrated in Part II.C. It is widely
believed that the doubling of the use of the excess basis is an abuse.
In that regard, note the paragraph from the conference report on the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 quoted in Part II.C. As a consequence of
that view, a number of provisions, including three of those described
earlier in the article, have been adopted to prevent a duplication of
the excess basis. An example of the commonly-held belief that this
duplication of excess basis is an abuse is contained in a
recommendation of the Joint Committee on Taxation in its
investigative report on Enron to "curtail duplication of losses." The
recommendation stated "a single economic loss should not be
deducted more than once. The Joint Committee staff recommends
limiting a corporation's basis in property acquired in a tax-free
transfer (or reorganization) to its fair market value. ... 84 While this
issue can arise in the context of other nonrecognition exchanges, we
will focus exclusively on section 351 exchanges.
The effort of Congress to prevent the duplication of losses is
based on an assumption that the duplication constitutes an abuse in all
circumstances. The visceral reaction to a circumstance in which a
double deduction is allowed is that it constitutes a tax loophole, so it is
understandable that such a circumstance would be assumed to be a
flaw that needs to be corrected. Let us now examine whether that
assumption is well-founded.
To put this issue in context, note that a transfer to a corporation
of appreciated property in a section 351 exchange will create a
duplication of the built-in gain. The corporation will have a built-in
81 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
84 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., ENRON: THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION'S INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, at 85 (Joint Comm. Print 2003),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/89349.pdf. As noted, this report led to
the adoption of section 362(e). See CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, JUMPSTART OUR
BUSINESS STRENGTH (JOBS) AcT, S. REP. No. 108-192, pt. 1, at IV-C1 (2003); supra
text accompanying note 57.
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gain for the transferred property and the transferor will have a built-in
gain for the stock that he acquired in exchange. What policy
justification could there be for double taxing appreciation that arose
in the hands of the transferor before the property was placed into
corporate solution? The apparent justification is to conform the
transaction to the principle that the incorporation of transferred
property in a nonrecognition exchange generally should not alter the
amount of gain that a sale of the property will produce - that is, the
amount of income that the transferred assets will produce should not
be altered when they are transferred to a corporation in a transaction
that qualifies for nonrecognition of gain or loss. Similarly, the amount
of gain that the transferor will recognize on a disposition of the
corporation's stock should not differ from the amount of gain that the
transferor would have recognized if he had sold the transferred
property instead of incorporating it. These consequences are
characteristic of the deferral element of nonrecognition provisions
and reflect the underlying policies for the treatment of section 351
exchanges.
Should not the same tax treatment that applies to the transfer of
appreciated property also apply to a transfer of depreciated property?
The same principle that dictates that appreciated property should
produce the same amount of gain in the hands of the corporate
transferee will also dictate that depreciated property should produce
the same amount of loss in the hands of the corporate transferee. The
application of the same rules to both properties might be referred to
as "parallel treatment." But parallel tax treatment is not required in
all situations; and there are numerous examples when it is not
applied.85 If, however, Congress chooses to apply a different set of
rules to the transfer of depreciated property (i.e., nonparallel
treatment), it should have a principled policy justification for that
difference. One obvious consideration is that the government gains
revenue by double taxing the transfer of appreciated property, but
loses revenue if it allows a double loss. But revenue enhancement
does not constitute a principled reason for disparate treatment and we
need to look elsewhere for a principled policy justification.
The application of the basis carryover rules to permit the transfer
of a built-in loss would be consistent with the treatment of a cash
method taxpayer's transfer of a business, which includes accounts
payable that will be deductible when paid, to a corporation in a
85 See Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of
Parallelism and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (2006).
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section 351 exchange. The transfer of the accounts payable will not
cause the transferor to recognize gain even if the amount of the
accounts payable is greater than the transferor's basis in the assets he
transferred.86  Nevertheless, the transferee corporation will be
permitted to deduct those accounts payable when it pays or accrues
87them. The tax law permits the transfer of a deduction to the
corporation and permits the double use of that deduction (once by the
corporation and once effectively by the transferor in that it insulates
the transferor from treating the liability as boot). This treatment is
allowed because it is deemed consistent with one of the underlying
purposes of section 351, which is to facilitate the incorporation of a
business.
There are three possible justifications for treating a transfer of
depreciated property differently from the transfer of appreciated
property. The first two justifications, which are listed and discussed
below, do not withstand scrutiny and do not justify the disparate
treatment. The third justification does pose a problem that needs to
be solved, but we shall see that the solution adopted by Congress is a
case of overkill.
First, permitting the corporation to succeed to the excess basis
that the transferor had in the property would permit the transfer of a
potential deduction from one taxpayer (the transferor) to another (the
corporation). Generally, the tax law frowns on the transfer of a built-
in deduction to another taxpayer; 8' however, Congress has made it
clear that it is not concerned about the transfer of the built-in loss to a
corporation in a section 351 exchange. The principal statutory
provision that addresses the double deduction problem is section
362(e)(2), described in Part III.B herein. Section 362(e)(2)(C)
permits the parties to a section 351 exchange in which depreciated
property has been transferred to the corporation to elect to limit the
transferor's basis in the stock he received to its value and thereby
permit the corporation to succeed to the built-in loss of the
transferred property. Clearly, Congress was concerned about a
86 I.R.C. § 357(c)(3). Moreover, the accounts payable will not cause a reduction
of the transferor's basis in the stock he received in exchange. I.R.C. § 358(d)(2).
87 Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113; I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200013044 (Mar. 31, 2000); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-30-010 (Apr. 14,
1978). The Internal Revenue Service (Service) will treat the transaction differently if
it is done for a tax avoidance purpose - i.e., if the transaction was not done primarily
for a business purpose. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-30-010 (Apr. 14, 1978).
88 The limitation on a donee's use of excess basis in donated property is an
illustration of the hostility to transferring built-in losses. See I.R.C. § 1015(a).
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duplication of loss deductions, but not about the transfer of the loss
deduction from the transferor to the corporation.
Another illustration that the tax law permits the transfer of
deductions to a corporation in a section 351 exchange is the
aforementioned treatment of a cash method taxpayer's transfer ofS 89
accounts payable to a corporation. The corporation is permitted to
deduct the payment or accrual of those payables and the deduction is
thereby transferred from the shareholder to the corporation.
Moreover, as noted above, sections' 357(c)(3) and 358(d)(2) directive
that accounts payables are not treated as liabilities for purposes of
those two sections effectively allows the shareholder to utilize the
deduction. The payable thus gives rise to two deductions - once for
the corporation and once for the shareholder. 9°
Second, putting the transferor's built-in loss in the corporation's
hands allows the indirect benefits that shareholders obtain from the
corporation's subsequent deduction to be shifted to other
shareholders. If there were other shareholders at the time that the
property was transferred to the corporation, the transfer of the built-
in loss will benefit all of the shareholders proportionately when the
loss is recognized and reduce corporate income. Some of the indirect
benefit from the corporation's use of the built-in deduction will thus
have been shifted to the other shareholders. Also, the contributing
shareholder can sell his stock to a third party and thereby shift his
share of the indirect benefit to the purchaser of the stock.
However, Congress has unequivocally demonstrated that it has no
objection to such shifting of benefits. Congress expressly allows the
transfer of a built-in loss to a corporation by permitting the parties to
elect under section 362(e)(2)(C) to limit the transferor's basis in the
stock he acquired in the exchange. This allows the corporation to
obtain the transferor's basis in the transferred assets, which results in
a transfer of the built-in loss in that asset. By permitting the transfer
of the built-in loss to the corporation, Congress has allowed the
shifting of the shareholder's indirect benefit of the corporation's
deduction of that loss. Similarly, a shareholder's indirect benefit from
a corporation's deduction of an account payable that was transferred
to it by a cash method shareholder as part of a section 351 exchange
can be shifted among shareholders. In addition, if the value of
property that is owned by a corporation falls so that it becomes
89 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90 See Douglas A. Kahn & Dale A. Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in
Internal Revenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73 MICH. L. REV. 461,464 (1975).
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depreciated property in the hands of the corporation, a shareholder
generally can shift the indirect benefit of the corporation's deduction
of that depreciated property by selling his stock before the deduction
is recognized.
Perhaps, one reason that Congress allows the shifting of the
indirect benefits that a shareholder can obtain from a corporation's
receipt and recognition of a built-in loss is that such transfer does not
affect the tax rate at which the corporation's benefit from the
deduction is determined. The deduction is taken by the corporation
at its marginal tax rate, so a shift of the shareholder's indirect benefits
has no effect on the amount of tax reduction that the deduction will
cause. The shift of the shareholder's indirect benefit from the
corporation's deduction does not raise an issue concerning tax bracket
differentials, because the deduction is taken by the corporation. Thus,
the dollar amount of the benefit will be the same regardless of the
identity of the shareholder. In that respect, this is quite different from
the problem of shifting benefits in a partnership context where the
benefit flows through to the partner at each partner's individual
marginal tax rates.
Is there a reason to be concerned about a shift of the
shareholder's indirect benefit? In our view, there is not. First, as
noted above, the shift does not affect the tax rates at which the
amount of dollar benefit from the corporation's deduction is
determined. It affects only the identity of the persons who will
indirectly enjoy the corporation's tax reduction. Secondly, except for
specified circumstances that are dealt with in sections 382 through 384,
the tax law generally has not shown concern about shifting among
shareholders the indirect benefits from corporate tax attributes. For
example, if an asset depreciates in the hands of a corporation, the
indirect benefit of that corporate loss when realized usually can be
shifted to others by a shareholder's sale of stock. 91 In contrast, in the
case of a partnership, Congress has adopted provisions to prevent
certain shifting of tax consequences from one partner to another,92 but
the concern there is over a reduction of tax rates since the
partnership's tax consequences flow directly through to the partners.
Even in the case of a partnership, a partner can shift most partnership
tax benefits to another person by transferring his partnership interest.
91 In certain prescribed circumstances, sections 382 or 384 will affect the
corporation's use of that tax benefit.
92 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(c). This provision prevents the shifting of a tax benefit
or detriment from one person to another by means of contributing an appreciated or
depreciated asset to a partnership.
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Thus, even as to partnerships, the disposition of a partnership interest
can result in a shifting of the tax attributes within the partnership.
There is no reason to treat a shifting of the indirect consequences of
corporate tax attributes more harshly.
Third, the availability of the doubling of the transferor's basis
allows the transferor to make transfers of depreciated property to a
corporation for the principal purpose of reducing the parties' overall
tax liability. There is evidence that this vulnerability to manipulation
is the source of Congress's decision to prevent the doubling of a net
loss.93 The concern over the potential for manipulation is legitimate.
We shall explain below why we believe that a blanket prevention of
the doubling of a net built-in loss is an excessively broad remedy and
how a more finely tailored remedy could and should be substituted for
the current provisions.
Let us begin with a few examples to see to what extent, if any, a
taxpayer can improve his tax position by transferring depreciated
property to a corporation if a duplication of loss is permitted. First,
consider the tax consequences of holding a depreciated asset that is
not transferred to a corporate entity. That situation is the base against
which the tax treatment of a section 351 exchange is to be measured.
Example 11. A, a U.S. resident individual, holds Blackacre as
an investment, or for use in his business, with an adjusted
basis of $100,000 and a fair market value of $40,000. A sells
Blackacre to an unrelated person for its fair market value of
$40,000 and thereby recognizes a loss of $60,000 ($100,000
basis minus the $40,000 selling price). The $40,000 that A
received is not taxable since it is a return of capital. The
$60,000 loss will constitute a deductible loss. We will ignore
the character of the loss. The character will affect the type of
income it can offset, but regardless it can offset some type of
income; and we will assume that the taxpayer has income
from which the loss can be deducted. The $60,000 loss
deduction will insulate $60,000 of income of the proper
character. Therefore, the end result is that A will receive
$100,000 tax-free ($40,000 from the sale and $60,000 insulated
income that he receives). Alternatively, if Blackacre is
depreciable (for example, an improvement on leased land) A
could take the $100,000 of depreciation over a period of years
and thereby insulate $100,000 of income. In either case, A
93 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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ends up with $100,000 of cash after-tax.
Now let us consider what the differences in tax consequences to A
would be if A contributes Blackacre to a corporation in a section 351
exchange. To simplify the calculations in both examples below, A will
be the sole shareholder of the corporation. In both examples, we will
assume that none of the Code sections dealing with double losses has
been adopted; this way, we can see what the consequence of the
double loss would be if no statutory restriction existed. We will
assume that the built-in loss of any property will be utilized to create
deductions that will offset income, because it is only when a built-in
loss is utilized to prevent the taxation of income that it might become
objectionable.
Example 12. Assume the same facts as those stated in
Example 11 except that A creates the X Corporation and
transfers Blackacre and other property to X in exchange for
all of X's stock. A's basis in each of the other assets is equal
to the fair market value of that property - i.e., the properties
other than Blackacre are neither appreciated nor depreciated.
A's basis in the stock that he receives in the exchange for
Blackacre will be $100,000, the same basis that he had in
Blackacre. Since we are excluding section 362(e) from the
problem, X's basis in Blackacre will also be $100,000. The
corporation can sell Blackacre for its fair market value of
$40,000 and thereby recognize a loss of $60,000. The $60,000
deductible loss can offset $60,000 of income that the
corporation earns. As a consequence, the corporation will
have $100,000 free of tax - i.e., it is in the identical position
that A was in Example 11. X liquidates and distributes the
$100,000 to A in exchange for the stock that A received for
Blackacre.94 A receives the $100,000 cash and recognizes
94 Of course, if X liquidates, it must distribute all its assets. In the interest of
simplification, let us assume that A has previously disposed of all of his stock except
the shares that he received in exchange for Blackacre. It would not change the result
if A held all of his stock, but it would complicate the calculations without changing the
involved principle.
While the $60,000 of income that X recognized will be added to its earnings and
profits account, the $60,000 loss that X recognized on the sale of Blackacre will
reduce its earnings and profits. Consequently, unless X has other earnings, it will
have zero earnings and profits. If X does not liquidate and instead distributes
$100,000 cash to A as a distribution on his stock, A will not recognize income from the
receipt of that distribution since X has no earnings or profits. Instead, A's basis in his
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neither a gain nor loss since his basis in the stock is also
$100,000. At the end of the day, A is in the identical position
that he occupied in Example 11. That is, he has $100,000 cash
after-tax.
Clearly, A's situation in Example 12 is not abusive since he gained
no advantage from the duplication of deductions. To the contrary, if
X were denied the use of the excess basis - for example, if X were
limited to a basis equal to its fair market value of $40,000 as currently
provided by section 362(e)(2), or if, instead, A and X elect under
section 362(e)(2)(C) to limit A's basis in his X stock to its fair market
value - A's transfer of Blackacre to the corporation would put A in a
worse position than if A did not make the transfer. That leads to a
perverse parallel treatment in that A will be worse off from a tax cost
position if he transfers to a corporation either an appreciated or
depreciated asset. It is capricious to apply a different set of rules for
the transfer of a depreciated asset in order to ensure that the taxpayer
will suffer a detriment.
There is, however, a circumstance in which the doubling of the
excess basis has consequences that raise legitimate concerns. This
occurs when the assets that produced the income against which the
deduction of the built-in loss was offset were not contributed by the
transferor as part of the same transaction in which he contributed the
depreciated asset to the corporation.
Example 13. In Year One, A created the X Corporation and
transferred Greenacre, with a value and basis of $40,000, to X
in exchange for all of X's stock. By Year Four, Greenacre's
value had risen to $100,000 and X still had a basis of $40,000
in that property. In Year Four, A owned Blackacre with a
value of $40,000 and A had a basis of $100,000 in that
property. Let us consider two alternative scenarios.
(1) Suppose that A transfers Blackacre to X in exchange for
additional shares of X's stock. Let us assume that the
exchange qualifies as a section 351 exchange despite the
likelihood that the transfer of Blackacre has no business
purpose. Remember that we are assuming that the facts of
these examples precede the adoption of section 362(e)(2),
X stock will be reduced by $100,000. So the tax consequence to A will be the same
whether X liquidates or instead distributes its $100,000 of cash to A.
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which therefore is not applicable to any of these examples. X
then sells Blackacre for its value of $40,000 and Greenacre for
its value of $100,000. The $60,000 gain ($100,000 selling price
minus the $40,000 basis) that X recognized on the sale of
Greenacre is offset by the $60,000 loss ($100,000 basis minus
the $40,000 selling price) X recognized on the sale of
Blackacre. X therefore has $140,000 (the combined selling
price) cash free of tax. X then distributes the $140,000 cash to
as a liquidating distribution. A will not recognize any income
on that distribution since his basis in his X stock is $140,000.
So, A ends up with $140,000 cash free of tax from the sales of
Blackacre and Greenacre.
(2) Suppose instead that A does not transfer Blackacre to X.
X sells Greenacre for its value and recognizes a gain of
$60,000 ($100,000 selling price minus the $40,000 basis).
Since X has no losses to offset against that gain, X will pay a
tax on its gain. For convenience, let us assume that the tax on
that gain is $20,000. After paying the tax, X liquidates and
distributes the $80,000 remaining proceeds to A (that is,
$100,000 selling proceeds minus the $20,000 tax). A
recognizes a gain of $40,000 ($80,000 proceeds minus the
$40,000 basis) on that distribution since his basis in his X
stock is $40,000. In the same year, X sells Blackacre for a
$60,000 loss. The deduction of that loss will offset the $40,000
gain that A recognized on his X stock, so A will pay no tax on
that gain. The remaining $20,000 of the loss on Blackacre can
offset $20,000 of other income that A has. The end result is
that A will have $140,000 cash free of tax ($80,000 from the
liquidation of X, $40,000 from the sale of Blackacre for its
value, and $20,000 of other income that is not taxed because
of the loss A incurred on the sale of Blackacre). That is the
same amount of cash that A obtained in the first illustration
above, but in this illustration, the $140,000 is not derived
exclusively from the sale of Greenacre and Blackacre. An
additional $20,000 had to be obtained from other income.
The reason for the difference is that the contribution of
Blackacre to X insulated X from recognizing income on the
sale of Greenacre, on which X will be taxed if Blackacre is
not added to X's assets.
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There is a question as to whether the insulation from taxation of
X's gain on Greenacre is abusive. If Blackacre were transferred to X
for valid business reasons, then the insulation is consistent with the
structure of the section 351 exchange in which basis is duplicated to
maintain the same built-in gain or loss both for the transferred assets
and for the transferor that would have been incurred if no transfer
had taken place. If Blackacre had been contributed to X before it
depreciated in value so that the depreciation had taken place in the
hands of the corporation, X could utilize the loss recognized on the
sale of that property; A would have the same amount of loss on his
stock; and there would be no objection to the double use of that
deduction. Why then is it objectionable when the decline in
Blackacre's value took place in the hands of A? It seems to the
authors that the objection centers on the potential for a manipulative
transfer of depreciated assets to be made for the principal purpose of
doubling the use of the excess basis.9 If, instead, the depreciated
property were transferred primarily for a business purpose, the
doubling of the use of the excess basis would merely be an element of
the system adopted for the treatment of section 351 exchanges and
does not warrant any restrictive treatment. Again, recall that a cash
method taxpayer's transfer of an account payable to a corporation
permits both the transferor and the corporation to use the deduction
for the payment of the payable provided that the exchange was made
for a business purpose.96 The doubling of a deduction is no stranger to
section 351 exchanges and is consistent with the policies underlying
that provision.
In that regard, note that if a cash method taxpayer transfers a
business with both accounts receivable and accounts payable to a
corporation in a section 351 exchange, the Service does not apply the
assignment of income doctrine to the receivables and allows the
corporate transferee to deduct the payables when paid or accrued
unless the exchange was done for a tax avoidance purpose. So long as
the section 351 exchange had a business purpose, the principles of
section 351 override other tax rules. 97 This is an example of allowing
section 351 principles to control in most circumstances and targeting
9' Even in that case, as reflected in the section 362(e)(2)(C) election, Congress is
willing to allow either the transferor or the corporation to utilize the excess basis, but
not both.
96 See I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2); Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul.
80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200013044 (Mar. 31, 2000); I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 78-30-010 (Apr. 14, 1978); supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
97 Rev. Rul 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113.
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abusive, tax-avoidance transactions for special treatment, rather than
allowing the possibility of tax avoidance to interfere with the avowed
purpose of facilitating incorporating transfers made for a legitimate
non-tax purpose.
The doubling of gain is a cost of contributing appreciated
property. Whatever justification there may be for doubling the
taxation of income arising in the hands of the corporation, the only
justification for doubling the taxation of the built-in gain on
contributed appreciated property is the goal of seeing that the same
amount of gain is produced by the contributed assets and is borne by
the transferors as would have been produced if the assets had been
retained by the transferors. That same principle applies equally to
built-in losses unless the parties are abusing the tax system by stuffing
depreciated properties into the corporation for the principal purpose
of reducing tax liability.
The authors agree that it is appropriate for Congress to prevent
manipulation of ownership for the principal purpose of doubling a
deduction. However, the principal statutory provision aimed at that
problem, section 362(e)(2), is overly broad. It improperly applies to
situations such as the ones described in Examples 12 and 13 even
when the transferor's principal reason for contributing the
depreciated asset to the corporation was non-tax profit motivated.
Section 362(e)(2) should be limited to circumstances in which the facts
indicate that the principal purpose of the transfer of the depreciated
asset was income tax avoidance.9
There is authority that a condition of qualifying an exchange with
a corporation for section 351 treatment is that a bona fide purpose of
the exchange be a non-tax business purpose.99 It seems likely that
98 That is the position that the Service adopted for section 351 transfers of
accounts receivable and accounts payable. See Rev. Rul. 80-198; supra text
accompanying note 87. Moreover, in discussing the adoption of section 336(d)(2), the
Conference Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 indicated that the prohibition in
that provision of a corporate transferee's utilization of a deduction for a built-in loss
that was acquired in a section 351 exchange does not apply when the transfer to the
corporation of the depreciated asset was made for a bona fide business purpose. H.R.
Rep. No. 99-841, pt. 3, at 11-201 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4286. See also Yin, supra note 16, at 625 (suggesting that it was
an error for Congress to have failed to provide a business purpose exception to the
application of the disqualified property provision of section 336(d)(1)).
99 Estate of Kleuner v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 1998); Caruth v.
United States, 688 F. Supp. 1129, 1138-41 (N.D. Tex. 1987), affd on a different issue,
865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989); 2001 FSA WL 961301(Aug. 24, 2001); 2000 FSA WL
1930524 (May 19, 2000). See BI~rKER & EUSTICE, supra note 24, at T 3.17(6); KAHN
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when there is a manipulative tax purpose for making a transfer to a
corporation of a depreciated asset, that purpose will be evident in
most cases, and especially so when the depreciated asset is sold soon
after the corporation acquires it. Consequently, the abusive use of the
doubling of excess basis rule will not be possible because the exchange
with the corporation will not qualify for section 351 treatment (or for
the accompanying basis rules).
If Congress is concerned that a business purpose rule will not be
adopted by some courts, it could address that issue by expressly
adding that requirement to section 351. That approach would attack a
narrow problem with a scalpel rather than with an axe. If Congress is
concerned that the vagaries of factual determinations may permit too
many taxpayers to establish a business purpose when none actually
exists, Congress could impose a greater burden of proof on taxpayers
on that issue or create a rebuttable presumption that if a transferred
depreciated asset is sold by the corporation within some specified time
period, such as two years, the transfer to the corporation will be
presumed to be tax motivated.
In addition to the business purpose rule, there are other grounds
on which the Service can challenge the transferee corporation's
deduction for a recognition of the built-in loss. If the transferee
corporation is a controlled entity (i.e., either controlled by the
transferor or if both the transferor and the transferee are controlled
by the same interests), the Service could invoke section 482 to deny
the transferee corporation a deduction for the amount of loss it
recognized on a disposition of the depreciated item to the extent it
equaled the built-in loss.'00 However, if the application of section 482
is merely to allocate the loss deduction to the transferor, and if that
allocation does not reduce the transferor's basis in the transferee
corporation's stock, the allocation will not prevent a duplication of the
loss deduction; it will merely provide the transferor with two
deductions instead of splitting them between the two parties. In
appropriate circumstances, the Service might be able to invoke section
269(a) to deny anyone a deduction for the loss recognized on the
disposition of the depreciated property to the extent it equaled the
built-in loss if the principal purpose of the transfer was evasion or
avoidance of the federal income tax and if the exchange conformed to
& LEHMAN, supra note 2, at 625-26.
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(f)(1)(iii) (1994). See National Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943).
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the requirements of section 269(a)(1) or (2). '
Alternatively, the Service could seek to disregard the transfer of
the depreciated property to the corporation on the ground that the
transaction lacks economic substance. A sham transaction has been
defined as one that: (1) has no business purpose other than obtaining
tax benefits; and (2) has no economic substance because no
reasonable prospect of profit exists.'02 In the view of the authors, the
business purpose requirement is an adequate ground for denying the
transferee a deduction for the built-in loss, but the Commissioner has
additional strings to his bow if he chooses to employ them.
In sum, the duplication of the use of excess net basis is
appropriate to provide the same tax consequences to the disposition
of the transferred assets and to the transferor that would have
occurred if the depreciated property has not been put into corporate
solution. There is potential for a taxpayer to abuse that treatment,
but that potential can be virtually eliminated by enforcing the
requirement that a non-tax business purpose be a principal reason
that depreciated property was transferred to the corporation. The
effectiveness of that limitation can be strengthened by imposing on
the taxpayer a greater burden of proof as to the business purpose
requirement and by establishing a presumption of tax avoidance
purpose if the depreciated property is sold soon after the corporation
acquires it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the first several parts of this article, we reviewed the operation
and possible justifications for section 336(d)(1)-(2), provisions that
limit the use of corporate losses in certain circumstances connected
with a corporate liquidation. As noted in the article, those provisions
were seriously flawed from their inception; but the situation worsened
with the recent passage of section 362(e)(2) which prevents the
duplication of the use of net built-in losses. As demonstrated in the
article, the passage of section 362(e)(2) makes the limitations set out
in section 336(d)(1)-(2) superfluous at best and contradictory to the
policies of section 362(e)(2) at worst. Those provisions should be
repealed.
In Part V, we have questioned whether there should be a blanket
101 See I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730.
102 Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
See I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730.
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provision preventing the duplication of a net loss and whether the
problem at which that prohibition is aimed is much narrower than the
scope of section 362(e)(2) would suggest. We propose that a narrower
and more specifically tailored limitation should be substituted for the
current provisions. This is a more disputable issue than is the
narrower question of whether section 336(d)(1)-(2) should be
repealed. A reasonable person could conclude, contrary to the
authors' conclusion, that the difficulty of preventing an abusive use of
the double basis rules to reduce taxes is so great that it is better to
have a blanket prohibition of any doubling of excess basis. In our
view, that remedy is too broad, causes inequitable consequences in
some cases, and conflicts with the underlying policy of section 351 to
facilitate the transfer of assets to a controlled corporation in order to
create a more efficient business structure.
To the extent that there is potential for taxpayers to stuff
depreciated properties in a corporation principally for tax reduction
purposes, that potential can be addressed and prevented without
eliminating the duplication in the many circumstances where there are
legitimate reasons for allowing it. In other words, the various
solutions that Congress has adopted do not address a problem that
needs to be solved.' °3 We hope this article, especially Part V, will
dispel the illusion that there are giants to be slain and show Congress
that in passing provisions like sections 336(d) and 362(e)(2), they are
merely attacking windmills.
'03 Our reasoning has no bearing on the worthiness of section 362(e)(1).
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